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ABSTRACT
This essay refutes the long-standing idea that Benjy Compson in Faulkner's The 
Sound and the Fury is merely an idiot. Instead of focusing on the issue of his language or 
his concept of time, an analysis of his surveillance techniques reveals Benjy’s various 
strategies as he exercises his power.  The application of Michel Foucault's theories 
concerning the powers of the disciplinarian gaze forces a change in the terminology with 
which criticism has labeled Benjy. By the end of the essay, a re-conceptualization of 
Benjy’s character occurs through a simple change of words: passive to active.  This 
change opens up new doors of understanding and suggests that Benjy is a highly 
manipulative agent of surveillance, instead of the traditional view that he is a simple, 
bellowing man-child. 
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INTRODUCTION
As English Departments engender the next round of literary critics and professors, 
the ambitious young scholar searches for a niche in his or her area of study.  Today, a 
student often finds his or her “new” insights into a favorite Faulkner text have already 
been approached, written about, debated, and even cast aside as passé.  Those seeking to 
burst through the critical barrier of referees to the esoteric club of the “published” must 
sometimes wade through hundreds of critical documents in the hope that his or her idea 
has not been discussed at length.  When approaching William Faulkner’s The Sound and 
the Fury and its critical reception,  I discovered this novel had been analyzed by all sorts 
of critics: structuralist, post-structuralist, feminist, new critic, and so on.  And yet I soon 
learned, Faulkner criticism, as it stands today, is in a stasis of sorts; largely, this position 
can be traced to the fact that most published essays on the text utilize much of  the same 
source material, most notably Andre Bleikastan, Cleanth Brooks, and Michael Millgate.  
All three of these Faulkner scholars contributed extraordinarily to the canon of criticism 
surrounding Faulkner studies, but with each inclusion of their work and the repetition of 
confirming or rejecting ideas from their respective seminal books, the “new” criticism 
becomes more and more recursive as a result of the weight each new subsequent essayist 
gives these “Fathers” of Faulkner criticism.  
The Faulkner scholar today suffers greatly from the anxiety of influence; taking 
his or her idea and Faulkner’s text as the love-object, he or she is forced to endeavor to 
commit critical patricide to make him or herself heard.  Instead of charting all three 
critics’ works and their domination of the critical field of Faulkner studies through time, I 
will use Andre Bleikastan and his book The Most Splendid Failure to illustrate this point 
and, subsequently, to offer a way beyond such impasses.
Andre Bleikastan writes prophetically: “The amount of unnecessary repetition is 
enormous, critical commonplaces abound, and like so much Faulkner criticism, many 
discussions on The Sound and the Fury are founded on the disabling misconceptions 
about literature in general and modern literature in particular” (Most Splendid vii).  In 
1976 after the first tidal wave of Faulkner studies broke, this statement was a jab at the 
churning motion that charted the ideas within Faulkner criticism.  Bleikastan proceeds to 
sum up the evolution of Faulkner criticism well enough to make one abandon future work 
in the field altogether. The necessary first breakthroughs initiated the comparison of the 
novel to the fall of Southern aristocracy (Arthur Kinney Critical Essays on William 
Faulkner: The Compson Family) which was followed by the perfunctory Freudian 
analysis in Carvel Collins’ essay “The Sound and the Fury: The Tragedy of the Lack of 
Love” that argues that Benjy is the id, Quentin the superego, and Jason the ego.  A later 
link in the critical chain included mythological parallelisms (Richard Adams Faulkner: 
Myth and Motion).  We can look back on these first essays with slight bemusement at 
how obvious they seem, but importantly these first essays began a discourse in which one 
speaks of Faulkner’s creations and accredited his work a certain legitimacy within the 
literary canon.  Each of these early discussions paved the way for criticism to follow and 
created the foundation to explore ideas utilizing existing critical language.  To give 
another example, Lawrance Thompson in 1953 writes an essay titled “Mirror Analogues 
in The Sound and the Fury” that postulates “the persistent allusions to mirrors in The 
Sound and the Fury would seem to invite the reader to notice that Faulkner has adapted 
the ancient literary mirror device and mirror principle to his own peculiar purposes” 
(211).  For today’s literature student who faces the further domination of the field by 
literary theory, we see the word “mirror” and impulsively think Lacan!  This response is 
exactly what Deborah E. Barker and Ivo Kamps did in their essay “Much Ado About 
Language and Desire in The Sound and the Fury” forty years later when they use 
Thompson’s mirror-images to argue in Lacanian terms that “none of the brothers are able 
to negotiate successfully the mirror stage” of child development (373).  Here, the reader 
chronicles the transformation of an idea using historical precedence and, subsequently, 
observes the morphing of that concept, with a new knowledge map, to elaborate a 
reoccurring image in Faulkner’s text.
Within the progression of ideas that occur in Faulkner studies, the above example 
illustrates that although original criticism of Faulkner occurs, it generally does slowly and 
not without significant indebtness to previous critics.   Bleikastan observes the problem 
throughout literary analysis; critical study slows to a crawl because everyone is reading 
everyone else, thus bringing a certain similarity to the new essays produced.  Perceiving 
the repetitiveness of Faulkner criticism, Bleikastan sets out to revolt--as much as a 
structuralist can--against this tradition; he changes the dialogue, elevates it to a position 
outside historicity and away from biography, and creates an environment in which 
Faulkner’s novel can breathe on its own.  Paradoxically, The Most Splendid Failure
brought new life into Faulkner criticism, but Bleikastan created anew a domination within 
the field--the one thing he set out originally to destroy.  
Today, an analysis of Faulkner without dealing with Bleikastan in some way is 
extremely difficult to do. Critics have stayed within Bleikastan’s general idea of focusing 
on Faulkner’s language and reasserting--sometimes unknowingly--the general analysis 
presented in his book.  Thus, although Barker and Kamps conclude the three brothers 
maneuver through the Lacanian Mirror Stage, they ultimately, end with a Bleikastanian 
assertion for example that in Benjy’s section there is “no distinction between I and non-I” 
(Most Splendid 71).  Even though Barker and Kamps try to create a new “onion-peel of 
interpretation” (to borrow from Roland Barthes), they cannot fully break away from 
Bleikastan, and at the end of their examination on Benjy, they conclude the formation of 
the Benjy-I is lacking, which is precisely Bleikastan’s point.  The Most Splendid Failure
is extremely important in the diachronic experience of Faulkner studies, but Bleikastan, 
and others, have become the shibboleth of Faulknerian criticism, ironically to the 
detriment of the generation of new knowledge.
   While I do not deny the need to probe Faulkner’s use of language, the coin does 
have another side, which I call the “situational.”  Even when the French theory revolution 
was assimilated into the critical discourse of The Sound and the Fury,  it only solidified 
the new circle of linguistic-based analysis, and Faulkner’s characters took a back seat to 
the critics’ desire to understand language as system and specifically Faulkner’s use of it.  I 
advocate an informed return to intra-textual issues, principally, the characters themselves, 
admitting they swim on and within Faulkner’s performative language, but not letting the 
primary focal point only be the performance of language.  I propose an analysis of the 
characters within their environments and situations with other textual characters, not 
treating them as “alive” but as functioning, constructed textual personalities, with all 
requisite acknowledgements to critical developments in theory.  This idea adheres to the 
conceit of Barthesian theoretic of the text, and yet while not focusing on the mode of 
language or the primacy of the Text in and of itself, this “situational” reading suggests the 
constant attention to the intra-textual characters and tries not to press them into an 
ideological function or to let a critical meta-text overly suffocate them.  
Granted, like the majority of scholars, I am invested in the romantic idea of 
criticism as a creation of new knowledge from a primary text.  However, in The Sound 
and the Fury, critical usage of outer textual material has not adhered to a metonymic 
usage but, within Faulkner’s novel, has slipped into metaphor for the meta-textual 
material.  For example, many attempts by early critics suggest that Benjy Compson is a 
Christ figure; sure, Faulkner plays some reference games here, but one wonders at 
validity of critically casting Benjy too strongly into the role of anyone else, especially 
Christ.  Instead of appreciating Christ as a “suggested” metaphor, critics working on this 
image tried to transform Benjy into a Southern Christ himself, citing as evidence Benjy’s 
age (33); the novel’s ending on Easter Sunday, 1928; and his castration as crucifixion.   
Within this perspective, Benjy is suffocated by approaches that say more about the 
continual importance of Christian symbolism than about Benjy Compson.  
 Approaching Faulkner through a situational lens focuses on characters in relation 
to themselves, their constructions, and their fictive environment, which I believe leads the 
critic to insights that respect both Faulkner’s text and meta-textual methodology.  
Surprisingly, my approach--informed by structuralism’s post-structural theoretical 
context--also respects the characters of the novel as characters and reveals the true power 
of these characters.  Discourses of power are actually among those least discussed in The 
Sound and the Fury criticism; not surprisingly, however, the historicity of power relations 
outside the text have had analytical dominance in the hope that the critic demonstrates the 
historical pressure that forms the novel (see for example Thadious M. Davis’s “‘Jim 
Crow’ and The Sound and the Fury”).  Related to such historical perspective exists the 
investigation of sexual/gender power essays that try to prove all women have enormous 
power over their male counter-parts, or that the female form is the catalyst for destruction 
due to male fear.  While these topics have been discussed, they, like the meta-textual 
structuralist criticism and archetypal criticism before it, have privileged a superimposition 
of methodology over the text.  
Within the critical context our ideas of power have been greatly influenced by the 
work of Michel Foucault who, from 1962 to 1982, devoted a career to the theoretics of 
institutional power and the formation of the subject, and yet every major figure in the 
French Theory revolution has been discussed in relation to The Sound and the Fury
except Foucault, whose work has been ignored probably because of the non-linguistic 
focus of his writings.  Foucault’s writings tend to be concerned with institutional 
structures and the use or foundation of the subject; he investigates the situation of the 
subject to understand the modality of institutional power.
In this study, Foucault’s ideas will be explicitly discussed as a backdrop to the 
situational aspects of Faulkner’s characterization allowing me to further probe the 
mechanism of power’s discourse within the text, once the characters themselves 
determine the structure and methodology of their own analysis.  In doing so, I respect the 
primacy of the literary text over Foucault’s theory, using it as a partial structural 
metaphor.  
A TALE OF SIGHT AND SMELL SIGNIFYING DEATH: BENJY COMPSON 
REVISITED
Critics and readers have perennially termed William Faulkner’s The Sound and 
the Fury a text that defies convention with characters who escape definition, but since the 
inauguration of the novel’s critical reception in 1950s, the character Benjy Compson has 
been called an “idiot” so consistently that one wonders at the validity of the claim 
regarding Faulkner’s definition-defying characters or the willingness of his critics to 
reassess their beliefs. Benjy’s consistent characterization is understandable given that 
Faulkner, at times, himself describes Benjy as “the idiot.”1  One interview in Lion in the 
Garden includes Faulkner’s explanation: “The only emotion for Benjy I have is grief and 
pity for mankind.  You can’t feel anything for him because he doesn’t feel anything . . . 
He serves his purpose and is gone . . . He was an animal” (245-6).  Over time, critics have 
concurred with Faulkner’s characterization, and criticism of Benjy has evolved into the 
image of Luster’s leading Benjy by the arm and searching for their anticipated quarters of 
interpretation in the branch of the text.  The stasis of this character within criticism 
suggests an inertia supported by tradition, but a successful reconfiguration of Benjy, 
which is crucial to understanding how he textually functions, depends on the reader’s 
checking the linearity of time and language at the door and immersing him or herself in a 
re-imagined world in which Benjy can be understood as he is, not as the critically-
informed have learned to read him.  This essay argues that to understand Benjy anew is to 
unveil some rather startling things about the act of reading, the nature of familial love, the 
intricacies of textual power, and the desperate struggle for control that occurs in the very 
act of reading itself.
To begin with, we must first reject the traditional, limiting notion of Benjy’s 
idiocy in order to show how he is a character of specific cognizance; his mental acuity 
adheres to a strict guideline of rules which have pattern and predictability.  The most 
discussed elements of Benjy’s idiocy are the style of Benjy’s illustrious “scene shifting” 
and narration; this jumping back and forth between present and past has created a cottage 
industry of essays charting these scene shifts.2  Most recently, Robert Parker “recharts” 
the scene shifts, but quixotically, in the introduction, he writes, “the first section of The 
Sound and the Fury lies in the scene shift’s extraordinary mix of anarchy and system” 
(4).3  Now is the time in the criticism of The Sound and the Fury to remove “anarchy” 
from this statement.  While Parker is the most recent example, such double-speak 
regarding Benjy’s chapter has not rung true for some time.  Critics from Joseph Warren 
Beach (1941) to Parker (1996) have acknowledged that Benjy’s section has structure; 
placing the elements of the text in sequence demonstrates order and an existence of 
structural time.  Benjy’s chronology, however, is related only to himself, and the reader 
must accept, assimilate, and maneuver within the character’s organizational methodology.  
Beach’s and Parker’s works are provocative, but their emphasis is on understanding the 
present-to-the-past scene shifts, instead of  focusing on the flashbacks for 
characterization.4  Although the charting of these shifts is interesting, the device is only a 
technical tool for Faulkner and is, in itself, limited as a means to understand Benjy who is 
not concerned with the present; all he cares about is the past.  The shifts are windows--
nothing more. 
For example, when Benjy finds Ms. Quentin by the swing in the present day, he is 
transported back to a moment when Caddy is on the swing (Faulkner 47).5  Ms. Quentin 
does not matter to Benjy, but her presence is the catalyst which connects him to a 
significant past event.  Later when Benjy is caught on the fence with Luster in 1928, the 
interior eddy of Benjy’s visual memory cycles to the time when Caddy and he are in same 
position (4).  Therefore, although a logical current of events exists between the instigating 
present event and the scene shift, the reader cannot concern himself overmuch with the 
actions on April 7, 1928; those occurrences function as signposts--like the swing and the 
gate--to comprehending the past.  Andre Bleikastan points out in Benjy’s section, “the
past may be turned into an implicit comment upon the present, the present an ironic 
reminder of the past” (The Ink of Melancholy 68).  However, Bleikastan misses that 
Benjy does not bellow about Jason’s stealing, Ms. Quentin’s escape, or his mother’s 
unhappiness; essentially Benjy “patterns according to his central concern: virtually every 
remembered episode consists of other’s conversations about him or of the incidents in 
which his sister Caddy plays a prominent role.”6  The reader must slip into Benjy’s shoes 
and adapt to Benjy’s patterns because the character’s modus-operandi lives in his 
memory, and thus to truly understand the character and how he functions textually, we 
must seek him there. 
Before we do so, we must dispel another critical myth.  Language, or Benjy’s lack 
thereof, is another traditional indicator used to argue for Benjy’s idiocy.  Bleikastan 
relates: “Benjy’s speech is indeed Faulkner’s attempt to . . . verbalize the non-verbal” 
(64).  In this statement, we find the dominant misconception of Benjy’s character.  The 
reader’s desire for Benjy to “speak” in our language has, in fact, silenced Benjy, but his 
bellows, as Faulkner constructs them, are a form of articulate communication.  If we 
assume the act of speaking pivots on hearing and interpreting, Benjy does speak a 
language.7  Luster understands Benjy’s “lingual” bellows (55), and Caddy responds to 
Benjy when she is preparing for a date, demonstrating a bilingual dialogue taking place 
within the text (42).  Recently, Stacy Burton anchors the misconceptions of Benjy’s 
concept of time and language in an argument against the idea of Benjy’s idiocy.  In her 
article, she suggests that “Criticism to date has tended to slight or even dismiss the 
dialogic context in which Benjy Compson lives and tries to speak” and more importantly 
asserts that “critics have tended to respond to the challenge of his [Benjy’s] puzzling 
discourse by seeing it as Faulkner’s formal experiment rather than Benjy’s narrative” 
(208, 214).  While Burton’s essay is important in Benjy’s critical reconstruction, the 
essayist chooses to play on the home-field of past criticism, when what is most needed is 
a change of venue.  The analysis of Benjy should move to another field of inquiry--one 
with different equipment for investigation.  
Michel Foucault provides a fecund and wholly untapped resource for the 
investigation of Benjy’s character through the concepts of surveillance techniques and 
power.8 In his book Discipline and Punish and other essays on penal methodology, 
Foucault investigates how European culture in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
developed the power of incarceration and torture to create a community of “docile 
bodies” (135-69). Unlikely as it may at first appear, Foucault’s description of Jeremy 
Bentham’s Panopticon is a particularly fruitful concept to reassess the character and 
function of Benjy.  Foucault explains that the Panopticon is:
A ring shaped building in the middle of which there is a yard with a tower 
at the center. . . In the central tower there is an observer.  Since each cell 
faces both inside and outside, the observer’s gaze can transverse the whole cell . . .                       
So everything that a individual does is exposed to the gaze of an observer who 
watches through shuttered windows or spy holes (Essential Works vol. 3, 58).
Bentham’s placement of the tower allows surveillance of the institutional subjects, and 
given its placement and size, the surveyed people are aware they are being watched.9  
This description of the Panopticon illumines the physicality of Benjy who is a “big man 
who appeared to have been shaped of some substance whose particles would not or did 
not cohere to one another or to frame which supported it” (Faulkner 274) and whose 
“shadow was higher than Luster’s on the fence” (4).  This human “tower” within the 
Compson household functions as a supreme site of textual surveillance; specifically, 
Benjy’s height and eyes (spy-holes) provide a vantage point from which the reader 
observes the actions within the text.  Bentham notes that the tower could be made out of 
“the most convenient scantlings of the timber” (39); its physical construction does not 
matter so much as its social function as a vector of power.  Similar details coincidentally 
echo Faulkner’s description of Benjy as a mental scantling; he is a “thing” (9) and a 
“baby” (8), which imply Benjy’s mental acuity is composed of simple material.  And yet, 
Faulkner gives the lead chapter--a quarter of his most famous work--to a simpleton who 
forces the reader to perceive the narrative through his own unimpaired vision.  
The physical appearance of Benjy as an architectural tower is  reinforced visually 
when Caddy, walking with Benjy in the cold, instructs him to keep his hands in his 
pockets (5).  Here, Benjy is the structural image of the Panopticon; from an elevated seat 
of power, he and the reader observe his subjects and survey the Compson household.  
Foucault’s theories of the Panopticon are particularly important in seeing Benjy as a 
narrative device in a discourse of textual power.  The power of Benjy, however, does not 
seek the docility of the Compsons nor the propagation of his own supremacy; Benjy’s 
power is observation itself.  This power of his gaze leads Roskus to make his own 
observation that Benjy “know lot more than people think” (Faulkner 31).
From the first line of the novel, Benjy’s Panoptic function controls his own 
“culture” through a discourse of surveillance.10  The first paragraph of his section 
tellingly serves as an induction into Benjy’s life.  As Benjy looks through the fence at the 
golfers, the reader witnesses the relentlessness of his observation, “Then they went on, 
and I went along the fence.  Luster came away . . . And we went along the fence and they 
stopped and we stopped and I looked through the fence” (3). From behind the fence, he 
stalks the golfers.  This first paragraph, written as a transcript of events, illustrates an 
energetic observer fascinated by his prey.  Although the pasture has been sold to pay for 
Quentin’s education, Benjy includes it in his world and subjects it to his surveillance; 
Luster knows this fact, “He still think they own this pasture.  Cant nobody see down here 
from the house” (19).  The movements of Benjy in relation to the golfers is the first 
evidence of Benjy’s narrative function: he sees, tracks, records, and by doing so structures 
the domain of his narrative.11
  As Benjy’s handler or attendant, but also as a subject of Benjy’s gaze, Luster 
indicates a dual role for the seen subject who is also a part of the seeing apparatus.  In 
Foucauldian terminology, this “see/being seen dyad” remarks on the inability of the 
viewed subjects to observe the watchmen in the tower; Foucault calls this event the 
dissociation of the dyad (202).12  In contrast, Benjy and Luster explicitly form a cohesive 
duality--a relationship only latent in Foucault’s system--which nonetheless concurrently 
allows for Benjy’s supremacy within the dyad configuration.  Luster sees Benjy watching 
him, both aware of the other; however, Benjy’s elevated narrative lens records and 
classifies, a skill which Luster lacks.  Essentially, as Dilsey remarks, “It’ll be in the Book 
honey, Writ down” (58).  In the text, Benjy demonstrates a supreme power: he “does not 
need to create life but rather possesses it with striking immediacy” (Kartiganer 25).  
Indeed, all the evidence of Benjy’s culture of surveillance, which the reader and the critic 
need for making interpretation, is chronicled in his section.13
A major narrative advantage that Benjy’s position and condition allow is his 
invisibility, precisely his ability to watch a person directly in front of him without being 
acknowledged.  Throughout his section, he moves through the Compson household, 
listening and recording, in effect mapping the boundaries of his text and organizing the 
relationship between people, but others appear not to notice him at all.  The conversation 
between Roskus and Dilsey about the lack of luck on the Compson estate suggests 
Benjy’s invisibility;  Roskus tells Dilsey, in Benjy’s presence, “They ain’t no luck on this 
place.  I seen it at first but when they changed his name I knowed it” (29).  Roskus’s 
philosophy that the Compson plight is tied to the renaming of Benjy is one of the few 
explanations for the family’s downfall.  In this case, Benjy’s invisibility serves as a highly 
profitable tool for gathering information from the servants of the estate about his family.  
Benjy moves behind the demarcation line of servant/master to view all sides, and his 
ubiquitous presence illustrates to the reader how he influences certain aspects of the 
Compson family.  For example, Benjy’s observance of Dilsey’s control of Ms. Compson 
supports a servant/master dichotomy shift.  After Benjy burns his hand, his mother 
bemoans her pitiful existence, and Dilsey counters, “You hush that now . . . You come on 
back up stairs” (60).  This scene, as recorded by Benjy, suggests that Dilsey exercises 
control in the house; more to the point, this encounter shows the servant’s language as 
technology which controls the master.  To Dilsey, Ms. Compson is just another child in 
the house, and the interesting use of “You hush” demonstrates a link between Mrs. 
Compson and Benjy, suggesting that Caroline’s much-referenced unhappiness is one 
more bellow Dilsey must suppress.  
Benjy’s ability not to be seen (what other critics see as passivity) allows him to 
record and thus organize his observations.  Invisibility supports his cataloging of people 
and events for the reader that helps to decipher other elements of the novel.  Outside of 
his section, Benjy’s surveillance becomes a cipher for the reader especially in Quentin’s 
section.  When Quentin remarks, “If I could say Mother Mother” (95), the reader 
essentially taps into Benjy’s chronicle (the scene with Dilsey) to understand that Quentin 
laments the absence of motherly attention.  Thus, the cold prose and Benjy’s transcription 
of events become intertwined and invaluable to the novel’s success.
Despite Benjy’s invisibility as he records other people, he is quite egocentric in 
what he reports.  All flashbacks are determined by a Benjy consciousness, and the reader 
witnesses Benjy’s repeated attempts to seek the past instead of remaining in the present.  
Benjy’s transportation to his past, which consumes the majority of his section, is based 
solely on him and his encounters or exploits.  Throughout the scenes on April 7, 1928, 
Benjy actively and quietly pulls Luster towards the psycho-analytic “switch” to guide his 
return to the past.14  After returning from the branch, Luster remarks, “Wait” as Benjy 
moves towards the swing where Ms. Quentin and the Man with the Red Tie are talking. 
Consciously, Benjy moves towards the swing because it allows him to rejoin Caddy in the 
same situation in the past (46).  This occurrence moves Benjy’s panoptic function outside 
the normal past-present continuum; even though his present observations are valuable to 
the reader, Benjy’s past is where his most critical thoughts and actions lie.  Benjy surveys 
both the present and the past with the same efficiency--a Panopticon that not only travels 
in space but travels through time as well.  Benjy, through his recording of the past, uses 
specific instances to illustrate his own pitiful existence as well as his tremendous power 
of surveillance.
  Evidence of this power is when Quentin and T.P. hold him violently and force 
“sassprilluh” down his throat to keep him quiet (22).  The horrific blandness in which 
Benjy relates the scene, “They held my head.  It was hot inside me, and I began again.  I 
was crying now, and something was happening inside me and I cried more, and they held 
me until it stopped happening,” illustrates sadistic qualities of both T.P. and Quentin for 
the reader (22).  The duration of the first section chronicles Quentin’s torturing his 
brother, an act surpassed only by Benjy’s subsequent castration by his own family.  The 
image of T.P., his constant “Whooey,” and his drunken hollering serve as interesting 
commentary; when Benjy reports numerous times that T.P. falls all over himself, the 
reader wonders what is the difference between him and his supposed “sane” attendants.  
Ironically in this scene, Benjy becomes  T.P.’s attendant by acting the more sane of the 
two.  More to the point, T.P.’s acts reflect on the Compson household itself.  If Benjy is 
in need of someone to care for him throughout the day, the choice of T.P. seems to be a 
gross dereliction.  Drawing sympathy from the reader, Benjy’s recounting of events 
illustrates his ability as a subordinate to remark on his “superiors” and color their 
characterizations as brutal or inept.  The power of these observations helps to frame 
Benjy as a victim and subtly draws the reader to him--a move creating empathy and 
validating his “unmotivated” observations and characterizations, and his construction is 
vastly different from an omniscient or typical third person narrator.  
Benjy’s enthrallment with the fence and surveillance of the golfers are keys to 
transporting himself to the scene of his own infamous crime and for controlling the 
reader’s understanding of the event.  At the fence in 1928, he remarks, “I went along the 
fence to the gate, where the girls passed with their book satchels,” and Luster replies 
“You Benjy.  Come back here” (51).  Consciously, Benjy moves from the fence to the 
gate and engages this portal of memory to include his attempted “rape” of the Burgess 
girl.  Benjy maneuvers to his goal; at the gate, he hears Luster say, “Come back,” which 
Benjy uses to return to T.P.’s telling him, “You cant do no good looking through the 
gate.”  Benjy pursues this memory until T.P. says, “You, Benjy.  What you doing, 
slipping out. . . You done skeered them chillen” (52).  Here, Benjy links to the memory of 
the family’s discussion about what they will do with him after the attack.    Benjy’s 
circuitous route to this memory establishes a predictable mind of remembrance that 
begins with the present and gradually winds back to specific past events.  Once at the 
scene of the attack, Benjy provides the reader with a record of the event: “ I opened the 
gate and they stopped turning.  I was trying to say, and I caught her, trying to say, and she 
screamed and I was trying to say and trying and the shapes began to stop and I tried to get 
out” (53).  The totality of the layers of memory demonstrates Benjy’s panoptic ability 
used for egocentric purposes.  The constant phrase “trying to say” leaves the impression 
of Benjy’s harmlessly telling the little girl that she’s overreacting; this scene with the 
Burgess girl comes immediately after his father and brother Jason discuss sending him to 
Jackson.  Benjy’s various memories from diverse experiences arise concurrently when he 
focuses visually on a gateway.
This sequence of events is deliberately organized.  Benjy’s version of events 
emerges after the reaction to those events gives him the last word as he describes the 
scene in as sympathetic a light as possible.  This method of discerning meaning, not 
chronology, is a “succession in due order” established by Benjy’s egocentrism (Brooks 
137).15  Benjy’s memory demonstrates not a “mosaic or patchwork of many voices 
seemingly recorded at random by an unselecting mind” (Bleikastan, Most Splendid 
Failure 68) but a developed sense of surveillance manipulated to provide a biased record 
of events.  In short, Benjy’s account of the sequence of events is a powerful rhetorical 
device.  
To further the impression that he has been misunderstood by those around him 
immediately after the attack, Luster says “Here, looney” (53).  Benjy’s convoluted path, 
from present to the past, is too linear to be considered arbitrary; the purpose of the 
pathway is to evoke the reader’s sympathy, and this fact is accomplished by a selective 
manipulation of the related events.  Countering the impression that Benjy does not 
understand the ramifications of his own castration, Benjy’s sight engenders evidence that 
he is in fact in control of the narrative.  In front of the mirror, Benjy remarks, “I got 
undressed and I looked at myself, and I began to cry” (73).  This scene, in which he turns 
his lens upon himself, is one of the last in his section and provides more sympathy-
evoking evidence of his cruel treatment. These events--with Quentin, the Burgess girl, 
and his castration--elicit the impression of victimization.  By examining the frigidity of 
his brothers’ relationship to him and the brutality of his caretakers, Benjy separates 
himself from them; through this idea of victimization, Benjy functions as a transparent 
surveillance machine more efficiently.  
Although Benjy is a competent apparatus of optic surveillance, his egocentricity 
causes a blind spot in his vision.  On the carriage going to visit his father’s grave with 
Ms. Compson, Dilsey gives him a flower to hold; Benjy observes, “She gave me a flower 
and her hand went away” (10).  While eating on the night of Dammudy’s funeral, Benjy 
describes his father’s leaving as “Father went away” (24).  A glitch in Benjy’s optical 
surveillance becomes clear; he telescopically sees and relates to whatever is immediately 
in front of him.  Like a camera, his eyes see objects move into a range of vision and out, 
thus, cutting off peripheral sight and disassociating the pan from the optic.16 Essentially, 
Benjy’s limited range of sight is a vital indicator of his egotistical way of life; Benjy is 
highly narcissistic, perhaps, detrimentally so.  His desire “to say” and his need to explain 
himself to the Burgess girl trump the possibility, in his mind, that she might be in pain, 
and when Benjy makes the observation that something “went away,” he signals his 
complete disinterest in that object and establishes that he has no “links to the outside 
world but those arising from his immediate needs” (Bleikastan  Most Splendid 75).  This 
perception places the Compson family in tyrannical servitude to Benjy and his 
surveillance.   A considerable amount of narrative space is devoted to Benjy’s being fed 
(25-6), preparation for bed (44,75), and medical care (59).  These memories serve to 
illustrate that those around Benjy serve him and, thus, imply that Benjy exerts control 
over the household.  
Despite his ability to see and record what happens around him and to quietly place 
his recorded subjects under his authority, Benjy’s peripheral optic impediment must have 
compensation in order for him to function as a more powerful pan-sensory agent of 
surveillance. Therefore, Benjy augments his complete peripheral input by utilizing his 
olfactory sense; his ability to harness his sense of smell allows him to transcend the limits 
of the Panopticon, which is tied to sight, in a bifurcated extra-sensory being of 
surveillance.17  The ability of Benjy to smell becomes a vital tool in his processing of the 
world and illustrates Benjy’s ability to adapt and understand events which others validate 
only through sight.
 Benjy’s nose serves as a surrogate for his inability to see certain events and 
bestially confirms experiences through smell. Coming to the gate and waiting for Caddy 
to come home from school, Benjy observes, “I could smell the cold.  The gate was cold” 
(6).  These simple statements essentially define Benjy’s use of smell as another means of 
surveillance.  His remark that he smells the cold validates the cold environment; this idea 
is reinforced when he feels the cold gate.  Benjy notices the similarities between 
touch and smell, uses his smell to conclude that it is cold, and relates that signifier to the 
gate; hence, the gate is cold.  This scene also presents Benjy’s sense of smell as reliable, 
and once the reader learns it is Christmas time in this flashback, Benjy’s olfactory 
observation is validated.  In addition to the ability to perceive weather through smell, 
Benjy recognizes movement through smell as well.  Walking with Luster back to the 
branch to look for the lost quarter, Benjy observes, “I could smell the clothes flapping, 
and the smoke blowing across the branch” (14).  The notion that Benjy smells the motion 
of the clothes, without seeing it, demonstrates that his nose functions, to mix metaphors, 
as an olfactory “gaze.”  
Besides observing his environment and motion through smell, Benjy’s olfactory 
sense perceives sickness and death.  On the night of Mr. Compson’s lying sick, T.P. and 
Benjy go to his room, and Benjy remarks, “Mother, feet walking fast away, and I could 
smell it.  Then the room came, but my eyes went shut . . . I could smell it” (34).  Here, a 
perfect example of the olfactory taking the place of the optic creates peripheral subjective 
perception.  Shutting his eyes to the scene, Benjy confirms his father’s sickness with his 
smell.  To further validate his correct perception, Benjy continues, “A door opened and I 
could smell it more than ever, and a head came out.  It wasn’t Father.  Father was sick 
there” (34).   Benjy illustrates his effectiveness as narrator by identifying that the person 
coming out of the room is not his father, and he provides the reader with the necessary 
transitional information to jump from Dammudy’s death to his Father’s deathbed.  Also, 
once the door opens and sight activates, Benjy remarks that he smells death “more than 
ever” and illustrates an element of degree between the smell before the door opens and 
after.  In the realm of sensory surveillance, Benjy’s smell confirms that his father is sick, 
and his optical and olfactory powers reinforce one another.  
By reconfiguring Benjy through the prism of sensory surveillance, the reader 
witnesses the transformation of a idiot man-child into a manipulating, powerful agent.  If 
one examines Benjy in this way, then such quizzical phrases as “I couldn’t see it, but my 
hand saw it” become a comprehensible rhetoric of watching.  Benjy’s extended sensory 
self examines his world and determines what is happening and how to proceed.  With the 
narrative configured through a Panopticon and his ultra-sensory surveillance, the text 
reveals new insights regarding the narrator’s, and thus the reader’s, relationship with 
Caddy.18  Piecing together the parts of Benjy’s spying apparatus is profitable because he 
must utilize, and does, all his faculties to strive for control of his sister.  Control is his 
goal, not love; in keeping with his narcissist egotism, he longs for Caddy because she is 
the one who goes away and does not come back.  He is the warden, she is the escaped 
convict, and Benjy’s section is a testament of his intractable pursuit of her.  Critics have 
argued that Benjy does not have the ability to understand subjective reasoning in the 
world around him; I argue that he just does not care.  Benjy’s selective mind, in actuality, 
chooses to disregard or chooses to “reduce everything to an unqualified opposition 
[Caddy and not-Caddy]” (Wadington 61).19  The events of Benjy and Caddy highlight the 
effectiveness of his power and ultimately his fallibility.  By extension, the reader 
physiologically performs his or her own relationship with the disappearing love-object.
As Faulkner himself noted in countless interviews, the genesis of the novel starts 
with the “picture of the little girl’s muddy drawers, climbing that tree to look in the parlor 
window with her brothers that didn’t have the courage to climb the tree waiting to see 
what she saw.”20  Faulkner recounts that the entirety of conflict and exposition of the 
novel hinges on the act of surveillance.  In relation to Benjy, this scene with his sister in 
the tree, as she spies on her family, signifies both the inauguration to his mode of living 
and the power that comes with the act of watching.  Moreover, this scene is the induction 
to the basic underlying conflict between Benjy and Caddy; he remarks that he does not 
only see Caddy in the tree but “We watched the muddy bottom of her drawers.  Then we 
couldn’t see her” (39).  Here is the microcosm of the Benjy (see)/Caddy (being seen) 
dyad.  Out of reach but not out of sight, Caddy’s soiled underwear serves as a precursor 
for her sexual promiscuity, which ultimately forces her to leave, or we might say “to be 
lost.”  
The beginning of Benjy’s section moves quickly to his surveillance of his sister 
and serves as an indicator of her leaving; Benjy’s first detailed flashback is of his waiting 
at the gate and hoping for Caddy to come home (6-7).  Illustrating the need to have Caddy 
in his line of sight, the scene also introduces the olfactory associations that Benjy relates 
to Caddy; she smells like leaves and trees, symbolizing a perfect Caddy, a natural 
unsoiled Caddy.  This dyadic version is the uncomplicated connection between the two, 
the relationship between watcher and watched moving together to form a complete 
surveillance circuit.  This image runs throughout Benjy’s narrative.  When he is in bed 
waiting for Caddy to come into his room, he remarks, “There wasn’t anything in the door.  
Then Caddy was in it” (44).  Here, Benjy’s camera-like optical perception reinforces the 
problematic lack of periphery in viewing his world.  Furthermore, this scene in the door 
illustrates Benjy’s ultimate conflict--Caddy can and will act outside his line of vision.  
However, when Caddy is in his boxed sight, he effects great power over her.  At 
the swing as he watches Caddy and Charlie, Benjy deliberately tries to stand between 
Caddy and her boyfriend.  His remark, “She put her arms around me and I hushed and 
held to her dress and tried to pull her away,” exemplifies the gazing power and the 
attempted physical execution of his control (47).  The reader witnesses Benjy’s 
possessive antagonism towards Charlie, “the one in the swing got up and came, and I 
cried and pulled at Caddy’s dress.”  This physical act is accompanied by the lingual 
exhortation for Charlie to keep his distance from Caddy and Benjy’s renewed attempt to 
carry her away.  
This scene could be viewed as her brother’s trying to protect Caddy from sexual 
aggression, but Benjy could be viewing the actions of Caddy and Charlie as a catalyst for 
his sister to escape his surveillance.  Caddy notices the force of Benjy’s desire and 
sweetly entreats him to let her stay and speak to Charlie.  However, Benjy’s egotism is 
having none of it; he keeps pulling at Caddy’s dress and crying louder, physically and 
linguistically prying Caddy from Charlie.  His actions are rendered effectual when Caddy 
tells Charlie to simply “Go away” (47).  Benjy’s recording, “She began to breathe fast,” 
alludes to Caddy’s possible sexual excitement, and Charlie, believing Benjy is an idiot 
because he “cant talk” (47), continues his physical maneuvers  providing a window into 
her actions outside of Benjy’s surveillance.  Caddy cautions Charlie saying “No, no . . . 
No, no . . . Are you crazy . . . He can see.  Don’t. Don’t” (47).  Indicating both Benjy’s 
surveillance competence and his power to “see,”  Caddy warns Charlie, not for his sake 
but for her own, and she disentangles herself from Charlie by running with her brother 
back to the house.  Benjy illustrates his power, and more importantly the reader witnesses 
Caddy’s consciousness of his power and her desire to please him.   This clearly 
performative rhetoric is for the reader’s benefit.  
Caddy offers herself up for repentance to Benjy, as he berates her with his bellow, 
beseeches his forgiveness, and explains: “ Hush.  I won’t anymore” (48).  The following 
line is most significant for Benjy’s power: “So I hushed and Caddy got up and we went 
into the kitchen and turned the light on and Caddy took the kitchen soap and washed her 
mouth at the sink, hard.  Caddy smelled like trees” (48).  Mollified for the present time, 
he hushes, and Caddy washes her mouth to prove that her repentance is genuine.  Benjy 
demonstrates his control of the narrative and his love-object by recording that Caddy 
washed her mouth and did it vigorously.  With Caddy’s action and Benjy’s watching and 
recording, Caddy redeems herself in his eyes, and he is contented.  Benjy’s remark that 
Caddy “smelled like trees” after her washing demonstrates his acceptance of her 
penitence, and she regains her purity for the time being.   
This tug-of-war for power scene is replayed on the night Caddy prepares for a 
date.  Coming from the bathroom, Benjy seemingly waits for her in front of the door.  At 
the beginning of the scene, Caddy feels the need to ameliorate her brother’s fear of her 
going away (42).  As Benjy follows her into her bedroom, he bellows at the smell of 
perfume; linking the smell of perfume to the smell of Caddy at swing with Charlie, Benjy 
fears the smell will lead to Caddy’s going away from him.  Deftly, Caddy understands the 
signification of the smell of perfume and remarks, “So that was it.  And you were trying 
to tell Caddy and you couldn’t tell her . . . Of course Caddy wont.  Of course Caddy 
wont” (42).  Despite Caddy’s statement that Benjy tried to “tell her,” his crying is an 
admonishment of her actions, and his act of watching accompanied by his cry of 
reprimand leads Caddy to quickly comply with Benjy’s wishes.  Caddy leads him to 
Dilsey, presents her with the perfume bottle as a present, and states, “We don’t like 
perfume ourselves” (42); connecting herself to Benjy with the pronoun “we,” Caddy 
indicates her preferences coincide with her brother’s as another demonstration of his 
power over her.  From the scene with Charlie and the perfume bottle in Benjy’s section, a 
tyrannical sibling law emerges which confines her, and the figure-head is Benjy.  
Furthermore, Benjy’s energy is devoted to restraining Caddy to a certain space 
within his box-shaped vision field.21  The conflict between Benjy’s desire to limit her and 
Caddy’s needs reaches a climax the night that she comes home after a date.  Most critics 
cite this as the point in the text that suggests Caddy is no longer a virgin.  The power in 
this scene is based on Caddy’s conforming to Benjy’s desire that she continue her 
innocent child-like self, but this scene is much more than a titillating “Did she do it?”  
This desperate power struggle is the ultimate showdown between the watcher who wants 
to hold tightly to the past and the subject who desperately tries to move out from under 
his surveillance. 
From the beginning of this incident with Caddy, Benjy understands the instability 
of Caddy’s subjection to him.  He observes, “Caddy came to the door and stood there, 
looking at Father and Mother.  Her eyes flew at me, and away” (68).  The notation of her 
eyes suggests that Caddy’s desire is to flee his gaze; her physical action reveals in a 
language he understands that she desires to leave him.  Her subtle act of defiance is not 
lost on Benjy because after Caddy’s fleeting gaze, he begins to cry loudly, “I went to her 
crying, and she shrank against the wall and I saw her eyes and I cried louder and pulled 
her dress.  She put her hands out but I pulled her dress.  Her eyes ran” (69).  The 
interesting aspect of this encounter is not the physicality of her brother’s pulling at her 
dress but the battle of the gazes between the watcher and watched.  Benjy becomes 
desperate when he notices that Caddy looks at him, and he engages her physically, 
suggesting that his subject of surveillance successfully challenges his power over her.  
Caddy’s watching him bothers Benjy so much that he refers to this act seven times in the 
course of two paragraphs.  In fact, after the remark of Caddy’s eyes running, he flees in a 
flashback to the instance of his name change and then cycles back to the scene on the 
night of Caddy’s loss of virginity stating, “We were in the hall.  Caddy was still looking 
at me” (69).   Benjy uses these flashbacks as attempts to flee her gaze by reasserting his 
own internal vision, but coming back to the present, he finds himself still under Caddy’s 
eyes.  
The scene on the night of Caddy’s loss of virginity is the beginning of  Benjy’s 
loss of power as well. On this night, the subjector becomes the subjected, and in 1928 the 
bellows at the gate are indeed the sounds of loss; however, the siren does not signal the 
physical loss of Caddy but the loss of Benjy’s power.  Of course, the April date of loss 
leads to Caddy’s wedding, her independence from Benjy, and the moment that Benjy’s 
raison d’etre becomes a search for a return to a sense of power.  With no subject to 
control with his gaze, he accepts surrogate, fetish-objects to mollify himself, satisfying 
his loss with Caddy’s slipper. Hence, the allegorical implications for the psychology of 
the identifying reader and for the very act of reading are profound.
Essentially from the moment of loss, Benjy’s life in April 1928 is dedicated to 
awaiting Caddy’s return to his field of vision, so he can once again gaze upon her with no 
interfering obstacles. His desire for Caddy’s return is articulated once again in the last 
line of the novel; as he and Luster drive through the family plot on the “right” side of the 
monument, the omniscient narrator of the fourth section comments, “Ben’s fist and his 
eyes were empty and blue and serene again as cornice and façade flowed smoothly once 
more from left to right, post and tree, window and doorway and signboard each in its 
ordered place” (321).  The “ordered place” refers to the arrangement of tombstones in the 
cemetery and alludes to the sequence of Benjy’s recorded surveillance in the first section; 
the order is not chronological, according to who died first, but results from Benjy’s 
memories adhering to the familial lineage.  As the head of the family, Mr. Compson 
comes first in flashbacks (9) and then Quentin’s death (32), which leads Benjy, who 
believes in an ordered existence, to expect Caddy’s “loss” next.  
Of course, one can say Benjy’s desire for Caddy “to be in her grave” suggests 
what ultimately drives Benjy’s “love” is a need for power, the nature of which is 
ultimately chilling, and is modeled through Benjy’s lack of peripheral vision.  Because he 
cannot see beyond his “vision box,”  Caddy in a rectangular grave plot is the perfect 
match for his visual capacity.  Such a conclusion is foreshadowed throughout the novel: 
primarily through confined spaces, those ubiquitous “windows and doorways” (321).  The 
image of Caddy framed in a doorway occurs for example, when he sees her coming into 
the house doorway (44), in the bathroom doorway (42), and in the window 
(40).   Significantly, two scenes in which Benjy and Caddy sleep together on the 
rectangular bed present the image of Caddy’s confinement in a geometric space that is 
reinforced by Benjy’s flower bottle, which Dilsey calls his “graveyard”(55).22  On the 
final page of the novel, the reader witnesses Benjy peering into his little graveyard in his 
hand, which leads Luster and Benjy to the actual graveyard where his family is buried.  
As they pass the “wrong” side of the town’s Civil War monument, a memorial to fallen 
Compson relatives, Benjy bellows, frightens the horses, and forces Luster to retrace his 
path and pass the monument again on the side Benjy prefers.  Once Luster gains control 
of the wayward horse Queenie and steers Benjy to the “right” side of the monument, “Ben 
hushed” (320) and was peaceful again.  Benjy’s final allegorical journey, an enactment of 
his desire for a lost Caddy to return home “to her ordered place” in the family plot, is 
arguably the pinnacle of the novel. The psychological implications are profound; eternally 
Benjy and, by extension, the reader watch for the day when he can resume his 
surveillance and assert power once more over his vanished love object, even if that can 
take place only when she is in her grave.
                                                          
1
 See James B. Meriwether and Michael Millgate’s Lion in the Garden:  Interviews with William Faulkner 
1926-1962 (146-7, 222, 245-6).  Interestingly, Faulkner hardly refers to Benjy by name and uses phrase  
“that  idiot” in discussing his character.  Worth noting is Sara McLaughlin’s essay “Faulkner’s Faux Pas: 
Referring to Benjamin Compson as an Idiot” arguing that Benjy’s actions are not “an idiot” but of someone 
with a form of autism.  I do not believe that Benjy approximates verisimilitude of the “mentally ill or 
autistic” but is its presentation as a textual construct who does not conform to our conventional ideas of 
time and language.
                                                                                                                                                                            
2
Robert Dale Parker points out in his essay “‘Where You Want to Go to Now’: Recharting the Scene Shifts 
in the First Section of The Sound and the Fury” (Faulkner Journal 14.2 1999, 3-19) that there was a “hiatus” 
between the years of 1964 to 1996.  Within Parker’s essay, he gives the chronology of  “scene shifting” 
criticism on page three.
3
 Parker also comments that Benjy’s section keeps “promising a consistent system, but [that it] never 
reaches the system that [it] repeatedly promise” (16).  This point is  difficult to reconcile because Parker’s 
exercise proves that a consistent system is in the text.
4
 Andre Belikastan warns in The Most Splendid Failure (Bloomington: Indiana Press, 1976) that “From the 
outset, the reader is jolted into the uncomfortable awareness of a text that refuses to fit into his prior reading 
experience” (68).  However, he writes that  Benjy’s section is a “mosaic or patchwork of many voices 
seemingly recorded at random by an unselecting mind” (68). Bleikastan also remarks in The Ink of 
Melancholy: Faulkner’s Novels from The Sound and the Fury to Light in August (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1990): “Benjy’s monologue is a proto-narrative held in timeless suspension, waiting for 
the reader to give it form and meaning” (69).  Echoing Bleikastan, Phillip Novak in his essay “Meaning, 
Mourning and the Form of Loss” (Faulkner Journal 14.2 1996, 63-90) argues, “if there is any real 
constituent of our concept of the novel as a form, it is the idea that although life as experienced contingent, 
without structure, we can nonetheless, we can in fact produce a perspective from which it would appear to 
have shape . . . And Benjy’s day is a narrative grounded in the total unavailability of any such perspective” 
(69).  This essay disagrees with Bleikastan because once a removal of all notions that April 7, 1928 matter 
to Benjy, then this “mosaic” becomes quite uniform.  It is worth noting that when Benjy is walking with 
Luster towards the barn in 1928, he remarks, “We passed the carriage house, where the carriage was.  It had 
a new wheel” (9).  The word “new” is linked to time, and Luster does not tell him the carriage wheel is new; 
therefore, we are led to believe that Benjy has a concept of “old” and “new.”  Both Bleikastan and Novak 
place too much emphasis on the reader’s  ability to understand, and not enough on understanding Benjy.  
  
5
 All in text quotations are from William Faulkner, The Sound and the Fury: The Corrected Text (New 
York: Vintage, 1990).
6
 Stacy Burton “Benjy Narrativity and the Coherence of Compson History,” [Caradozo Studies of Law and 
Literature ]7.2 1995: 207-28.
7
 Deborah E. Barker and Ivo Kamps in their essay “Much Ado About Nothing: Language and Desire in The 
Sound and the Fury” (Mississippi Quarterly 46.3 1993: 373-93) posit that “Benjy has been alienated by 
language; and he will never resolve this “discordance with his own reality” (388).  It is my belief that 
Barker and Kamps over-interpret Benjy’s language to fit Lacan’s idea of symbolic discourse.  Benjy is not 
alienated by language; he has his own which the people around him understand.  During the 1990s, work 
was done on the language of Faulkner’s text in relation to Lacan’s ideas of Symbolic Order; the best of 
these is Doreen Fowler’s “‘Little Sister Death’: The Sound and the Fury and the Denied Unconscious” 
(Faulkner and Psychology.  Jackson: UP of Mississippi: 1994) who rightly asserts, “Benjy does not exist 
within the symbolic order” (5).  It is profitable when examining Benjy’s language to remember that 
Saussure explains language is based on a sign/signifier relationship and predicated on at least two people to 
complete the “speaking-circuit” (Course in General Linguistics 11).  Thus, Benjy’s bellows are received by 
Caddy and Luster and interpreted as a signifier of a particular sign; the circuit is completed.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
8
 As of the writing of this essay,  Foucauldian theories do not appear in The Sound and the Fury criticism.  
It is my hope that this essay will create another venue for examining Faulkner’s text.  Paula Mesquita uses 
Foucault’s theories of power in her essay about Sanctuary entitled “Law(s) and Disorder(s): Male Trouble 
in Faulkner’s Sanctuary.”  Also,  I am indebted to Simon During, for his book Foucault and Literature: 
Towards a Geneology of Writing, who explains the realm of Foucauldian thought and applies it to certain 
literary texts to illustrate its effectiveness at creating new ideas about certain literary texts.
9
 One must keep in mind that Foucault is “interpreting” the methodology of the Panopticon of which he 
disapproves.  For a more Bentham-friendly interpretation and history of how the Panopticon began, see 
Janet Semple’s Bentham’s Prison: A Study of the Panopticon Penitentiary.  She counters that the 
Panopticon was “not theoretical but a viable project which commanded wide-spread support” (18).  In 
addition to the theories of Foucault and Semple, one could review Bentham’s The Panopticon Writings 
edited by Miran Bozovic.
10
 Within  this essay, the term “Panoptic” is the power of the gaze as explained by Foucault.  This meaning 
will be contrasted by the lower case “panoptic” which is the literal use of the term.
11
 Symbiotically, Benjy and Luster work cooperatively to satisfy Benjy’s need for surveillance. Luster 
understands what makes the Benjy function “happy,” and he strives to feed Benjy’s need for observation.  
12
Discipline and Punishment (trans. Alan Sheridan.  New York: Random, 1995).
13
  Donald Kartiganer “The Sound and the Fury and the Dislocation of Form” reprinted in Harold Bloom’s 
Modern Critical Interpretations : William Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury (Philadelphia: Chelsea House, 
1998, 23-38).
14
 Freud describes “switch words” as  seemingly ambiguous or inconsequential words used during the act of 
speaking that “act like points at a junction” which, once the word is spoken, open up other memories stuck 
inside the unconscious.  See Freud’s Dora: An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria (New York: Touchstone, 
1997).
15
 This quotation is taken from Arthur F. Kinney’s collection of essays on the Compson family entitled 
Critical Essays on William Faulkner: The Compson Family (Boston: Hall and Co., 1982).  Cleanth Brooks’ 
article reprinted in Kinney’s compilation is from his William Faulkner: The Yoknapatawpha Country (New 
Haven: Yale U.P., 1963 334-48).
16
 Noel Polk in his book Children of the Dark House: Text and Context in Faulkner (Jackson: Mississippi 
U.P., 1996) remarks in his chapter on The Sound and the Fury that Benjy’s “‘narration,’ is almost 
completely visual, cinematic, and what rolls through his mind is not ‘memory,’ . . . but rather more nearly 
reels, perhaps, from a movie of his life” (105). 
                                                                                                                                                                            
17
 Foucault believes that all disciplinarian techniques and practices stem from the “laws of the optic” (D&P 
177).  Simply, Foucault believes that it is the optic gaze that properly utilizes surveillance, and the paranoia 
from this gaze causes discipline from those being watched.  However, Benjy, as a institution of surveillance, 
demonstrates a more complex sensory apparatus of surveillance than just the pan-optic, possibly suggesting 
--against Foucault’s theory of discipline--that individuals can attain a more complex and more effective 
means of surveillance than man-made institutional structures, like Bentham’s Panopticon.
18
 After all, understanding or “knowing” through metaphors of sight--“seeing the light,” “perceiving the 
truth,” etc.--is only a form of technology.  Thus, the addition of new technologies--understanding through 
sight and smell for instance--allows for the generation of new knowledge.
19
 Warwick Wadington “The Sound and the Fury and the Logic of Tragedy,” reprinted in Bloom’s Modern 
Critical Interpretations  57-68.
20
Faulkner in the University  (Charlottesville: U.P. of Virginia, 1995).
21
 The transformation of the person Caddy into the slipper Caddy is an interesting aspect of Foucault’s 
ideas at play in Faulkner’s text.  Foucault states that the purpose of  discipline is not just transforming 
individuals into a “uniform mass,” but it is a “specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as 
objects and as instruments of its exercise” (D&P 170).  Benjy advances this idea further by transforming 
Caddy, in her absence into the object of the slipper, pushing Foucault’s theory into the literal object instead 
of a metaphor in the discourse of power.  Benjy uses the slipper as a means to revisit his power over Caddy 
demonstrating that the slipper acts an “instrument” in his surveillance technique.  The slipper is a way to 
survey the past and also the only way for Benjy to watch a “part” of Caddy in her absence.
22
 In a “Rose for Emily,” Faulkner describes the past not as a chronological series of events but something 
one passes into as though, “the narrow bottleneck of the most recent decade of years” (Collected Stories of 
William Faulkner, New York: Vintage, 1995).  Emily and Benjy, as Faulknerian characters, represent the 
drive to confine the love-object, and failing to do that, Emily creates her own graveyard for her lover 
Homer Barron. 
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